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The Vietnam War remains a hotly debated topic in the United States. With the 
passage of years, new sources become available, and scholars with fresh perspec-
tives, not burdened with earlier, ideological quarrels, start to grapple with the subject. 
Edward Miller’s book deals with one of the most controversial topics of the pre-
American Vietnamese War: The United States relations with South Vietnamese presi-
dent Ngo Dinh Diem and the role in the history of the man himself. Ngo Dinh Diem 
remains a controversial ﬁ gure to this day, ﬁ nding both bitter detractors,1 and ﬁ erce 
admirers2 amongst American historians. However, most of those books are written 
from a purely American perspective. Miller makes Ngo Dinh Diem the main ﬁ gure of 
his book, quite correctly arguing that “by continuing to rely on those clichés, Diem’s 
admirers and critics have failed to give him his due as a historical actor.”3 By using 
wealth of Vietnamese sources, both printed and oral, the author of Misalliance sets 
before himself the ambitious goal of showing not only the true Diem, but also the 
objectives and motives of his policies, which Miller claims were both poorly under-
stood and misinterpreted both by Diem’s contemporary politicians and journalists, 
and historians in later years.
The book is split into nine chapters. It is equipped with an index, footnotes, and 
a list of abbreviations and published collections of government documents. However, 
it doesn’t have a separate bibliography, making it harder to ﬁ nd speciﬁ c publications.
The ﬁ rst chapter, Man of Faith, is dedicated to Ngo Dinh Diem and his life prior 
his appointment to the position of State of Vietnam prime minister in June 1954. It 
is very informative and provides good insight into the Ngo family, which formed, 
inspired, and actively helped Diem during his whole career.4 Miller goes to great 
lengths to dispel many myths that circulated about the Vietnamese president dur-
ing his time, and persist in a part of American historiography to this day. For ex-
ample, the author of Misalliance skillfully presents how the June 1954 nomination of 
1  D.L. Anderson, The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War, New York, Chichester 2002, pp. XIV 
+ 308; S. Karnow, Vietnam. A History, New York 1983, pp. XI + 752.
2  M. Moyar, Triumph Forsaken. The Vietnam War 1954–1965, New York 2006, pp. XXXII + 17.
3  E. Mil ler, Misalliance. Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States and the Fate of South Vietnam, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, London, England 2013, p. 14.
4  Diem was the third of six sons fathered by prominent Vietnamese mandarin, Ngo Dinh Kha, each 
of them attaining high rank in public service or Church.
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Diem to the position of prime minister was not a CIA plot or a question of external 
pressure, but in fact the eﬀ ect of long-term backstage activities of the Ngo brothers 
and their associates. Miller also devotes much attention to the present the issue of 
Ngo Dinh Nhu’s Personalism ideology and the Can Lao secret party without the 
common American bias, which usually culpably simpliﬁ ed them.
The second chapter, New Beginnings, focuses on presenting the American concept 
of nation building, and the plans to implement it in the South Vietnam. Miller argues 
that “for many of the Americans who aspired to build nations overseas after 1945, the 
New Deal would serve as a touchstone of developmentalist ideas and models.”5 He 
distinguishes two competing schools of thought in the American concept of building 
developed societies: high modernism, which promoted top-down change in a form 
of big, centrally-controlled projects, inspired by the example of the Tennessee Val-
ley Authority,6 and low modernism, which argued that social change should come 
by the way of small-scale, locally-based initiatives, and was especially interested in 
a question of agrarian reforms in Third World countries. Miller also touches the topic 
of American academic circles, enthusiastically collaborating with US government 
oﬃ  cials on those nation building projects. The chapter also deals with the initial 
American attitude towards Ngo Dinh Diem, which was far from enthusiastic.
The third chapter, The Making of an Alliance, presents the ﬁ rst, most troublesome 
year of Diem’s rule, from the June 1954 to May 1955. It describes in details the most 
important upheavals and crises of this period: the attempted coup of general Nguyen 
Van Hinh, the struggle for power with the French and politico-religious organizations 
Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, the disagreements and diﬃ  cult cooperation with American 
special envoy, general Joseph Lawton Collins, and the ﬁ ght for power over Saigon 
against the crime syndicate Binh Xuyen, which culminated in the Battle of Saigon at 
the end of April 1955. The biggest advantage of this chapter is the fact that Miller 
breaks up with usual practice of presenting those events from a purely American 
viewpoint. He convincingly shows how Americans taking part in those events overes-
timated and exaggerated their own role, and explores the motives of Ngo Dinh Diem 
and his fraction, rightly presenting the South Vietnamese prime minister as the main 
actor and scriptwriter of the drama taking place in the ﬁ rst year of his rule.
Chapter 4, Revolutions and Republics, starts with description of the immediate 
aftermath of the Battle of Saigon, and the dramatic change of American politics to-
wards South Vietnam. It then proceeds to depict the concept of National Revolution 
coined by Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu, the referendum to depose the former 
emperor Bao Dai, and the birth of the Republic of Vietnam. Miller then presents 
how Diem’s and US concepts of democracy, agrarian revolution and nation building 
were in many aspects similar enough to allow the alliance and cooperation, but at the 
same time diﬀ erent enough to create tensions and plant seeds for a future rupture in 
relations. Again, the author of Misalliance goes beyond the simplistic discourse of 
5  E. Mil ler, op. cit., p. 56.
6  TVA is a corporation, owned by the US federal government, created in 1933 to oversee economic 
development in the Tennessee Valley, a region exceptionally hit by Great Depression. It provides navi-
gation, energy, fertilizers and ﬂ ood control to this day, https://www.tva.gov/ (access: 20.01.2016).
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Diem – democrat or tyrant?, showing that the South Vietnamese president, like many 
other Third World leaders, had a vision of his own, which was misunderstood by his 
oversea partners.
Chapter 5, Settlers and Engineers, centers around one of most controversial topics 
of Diem’s presidency – the rural reform in South Vietnam. The author of the book 
shows that for the Ngo brothers, the re-making of the rural landscape of their country 
was not only about the economy and security. South Vietnamese rural development 
was also aimed to change the Vietnamese farmer himself, and turn him into a re-
sponsible member of the national community, with the use of the Personalist ideol-
ogy. Miller uses examples of three diﬀ erent agricultural programs to show that while 
Diem’s approach could, and in some places was successful, in the end, for various 
reasons, his concept of development of rural areas didn’t succeed.
Chapter 6, Countering Insurgents, is dedicated to a period of renewed communist 
activity in the South, which symbolically started with the attempt to assassinate Diem 
on February 27th 1957. Forced to take action by the eﬀ ective anticommunist gov-
ernment campaigns in South Vietnam, Hanoi restarted terror activities of its cadres 
below the 17th Parallel. This in turn resulted in even more ruthless and wide-reaching 
government activities, which also swept along many non-communist opponents of 
the regime. The situation escalated over the years, turning into open guerrilla warfare 
in 1960. The chapter also deals with the failed Paratrooper Coup, that took place in 
November 1960, and was the ﬁ rst real challenge to Diem’s rule since the turbulent 
year 1955.
Chapter 7, Limited Partners, focuses on the hopes of both Vietnamese and Ameri-
cans related with new presidential administration of John F. Kennedy. In the end, 
those hopes were reduced to a “limited partnership” instead of a full-ﬂ edged alliance 
that Diem was hoping for.7 In this part the book also deals with the Strategic Hamlet 
Program, which, as Miller points out, for the Vietnamese was not only a simple secu-
rity measure to regain the control over the countryside population, as it is usually de-
scribed in American historiography, but also a tool of changing the South Vietnamese 
rural society in accordance with the Personalist ideology. This part of Misalliance 
also touches on the diﬀ erences between Americans and the Vietnamese about the 
methods of implementation and the goals of the Strategic Hamlet Program, that came 
to light during its creation and realization.
Chapter 8, Mixed Signals, starts at the beginning of 1963, when both governments 
looked with optimism into the future, content that the “tide of the struggle had al-
ready changed.”8 This however abruptly shifted with the Buddhist Crisis that erupted 
in May 1963. Miller argues that Vietnamese Buddhists saw their religion inseparably 
connected with the fate of their nation, and had their nationalist vision of their own, 
making them rivals to Diem. However, despite that, they coexisted with the govern-
ment surprisingly well until the crisis of 1963. Even after the outbreak of the crisis, 
both sides at ﬁ rst tried to ﬁ nd a compromise. Yet, when things moved to a confronta-
7  E. Mil ler, op. cit., p. 231.
8  Ibidem, p. 249.
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tion, and the government decided to use force, it turned out that the American public 
opinion is vehemently against Diem’s regime, in contrast to year 1955. The author of 
Misalliance argues, however, that the American belief of a religious cause of the con-
ﬂ ict is erroneous, and in reality it was a clash of two competing visions of Vietnam.
Chapter 9, The Unmaking of an Alliance, is dedicated to the last, tense period of 
American relations with Ngo Dinh Diem, from August to November 1963. Miller 
depicts the suﬀ ocating atmosphere of Saigon, when rumors of plots and counterplots 
circled endlessly, and mutual suspicion was commonplace. The author devoted a lot 
of space to the backstage machinations of Ngo Dinh Nhu,9 who sought to ensure the 
safety of the regime of his brother, at the same time trying to outmaneuver various 
groups of plotters and mend Vietnamese-American relations. However, he made a fa-
tal mistake of misjudging the intentions of the US ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge 
Jr., who from the moment of his arrival in Saigon by the end of August, worked tire-
lessly to depose Diem and his family, ﬁ nally succeeding in November 1963.
By using wealth of Vietnamese sources, both printed and oral, the author of Mis-
alliance carefully crafts intricate portrait of Ngo Dinh Diem and his complicated 
relation with the United States. The main merit of this book lays in the abandon-
ment of black and white narration about Ngo Dinh Diem, which until very recently 
dominated in American historiography. Edward Miller convincingly shows that 
things and actions that were obviously undemocratic, rash, heavy-handed and in-
comprehensible for Americans, in reality were thoroughly thought through and in 
full accord with the idea of democracy in the vision of Ngo Dinh Diem. A vision that 
was vastly diﬀ erent from the American one, true, but far from the reactionary despot 
devoted to “hopelessly backward ideas,”10 like he was depicted by many Americans.
Misalliance is a very well written book, and Miller had put much eﬀ ort (and 
succeeded) in describing complex issues in an accessible manner, at the same time 
without falling into cliché and simpliﬁ cation. The main points of his book: that 
Ngo Dinh Diem was a shrewd, standalone operator with his own vision for Vietnam’s 
modernization, that Americans and the Vietnamese both wanted to pull the modern-
ization cart, but each in a slightly diﬀ erent direction and by a diﬀ erent route, and that 
the politics of nation building in Vietnam were inﬂ uenced both by competing Ameri-
can visions of modernization, and interactions and rivalries among the Vietnamese 
themselves, are presented in a convincing way and based on a broad source base.
However, the book also has some ﬂ aws. It is sometimes hard to ﬁ nd clear evalu-
ation of the decisions made by American policymakers, especially in the critical few 
last months before the November coup of 1963. The author also has a tendency to 
gloss over some important details that are inconvenient from the US perspective.
Writing about the failed Paratrooper Coup of 1960, Miller writes that „Diem and 
Nhu suspected – incorrectly, as it turned out – that some Americans had encouraged 
9  Which included conﬁ dential contacts with Viet Cong and Hanoi representatives, and the inter-
mediary of Polish representative in International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, 
Mieczysław Maneli. Ibidem, pp. 305–307.
10  Ibidem, p. 14.
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the coup.”11 It is not only an understatement, it is plain wrong. Even the documents 
from Foreign Papers of United States alone show that at least some of the US Em-
bassy personnel sympathized with the rebels and had prior knowledge of the coup. 
For example, moments after the ﬁ rst shots were ﬁ red in Saigon, the Counselor of the 
Embassy for Political Aﬀ airs, Joseph Mendenhall, declared that it was an “attempt by 
non-Communists to overthrow the Diem Government.”12 In the next hours he “rec-
ommended that the Embassy take a neutral position towards the coup, for it soon be-
came clear that the other side was ‘as much a friend of ours as Diem was.’”13 Writing 
about the joint fact-ﬁ nding mission of the Department of State and the Department 
of Defense that president Kennedy sent to Vietnam in summer 1963, which resulted 
in his famous quip “The two of you did visit the same country, didn’t you?,”14 Miller 
omits the fact that the Department of State representative was Joseph Mendenhall 
himself. In other words, the report that described Ngo’s “reign of terror” and raised 
“the specter of a religious war,”15 was written by the man who wanted to depose 
Ngo Dinh Diem as early as in 1960.
Describing the battle of Ap Bac, the author of Misalliance places lieutenant colo-
nel John Paul Vann as a mere observer, while in reality Vann was the main advisor of 
the South Vietnamese forces present on the battleﬁ eld, and was directly responsible 
for the disaster that took place.16 The role of the American press corps in turning the 
US public opinion against Diem is also touched on very brieﬂ y.
Introducing the ﬁ gure of Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., Miller doesn’t write about the 
political motivations of President Kennedy, who nominated a potential rival in the 
presidential election to the post of ambassador to Vietnam to pull the Republican 
Party into responsibility for the US policy in Vietnam. In eﬀ ect, when Lodge started 
to create his own policy in Vietnam in October 1963, encouraging the conspiring 
generals, Kennedy was too scared about the political consequences to call oﬀ  his 
disobedient envoy, ending in a situation when, in the words of Secretary McNamara, 
“We’re dealing with [the situation in South Vietnam – author’s note] through a press-
minded ambassador and an unstable Frenchman.”17Misalliance also lacks that last 
paragraph about the ultimate fate of Diem. The book closes with a scene where he 
boards an armored carrier and drives oﬀ . And while the readers reaching for Misalli-
ance probably are familiar with the tragic end of Ngo Dinh Diem, it would be ﬁ tting 
to end the book with a complete description of his fate.
Finally, the book’s conclusions remain silent about the dire consequences of the 
death of the ﬁ rst President of the Republic of Vietnam. One can risk to claim that the 
author deliberately omitted them because attempting to maintain a balanced tone of 
11  Ibidem, p. 204.
12  Editorial Note, undated, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. I, pp. 660–663.
13  Ibidem.
14  E. Mil ler, op. cit., p. 299.
15  Ibidem.
16  Vann was later actively involved in the whitewashing of his own role in the clash. M. Moyar, 
op. cit., pp. 186–205.
17  Ibidem, p. 259.
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his work, and seeking to give a voice to all parties in this aspect he would have to 
unequivocally admit that the overthrowing of Diem was short-sighted and brought 
a disaster to both the Vietnamese and the Americans.
Despite of the above concerns, Misalliance by Edward Miller is deﬁ nitely rec-
ommendable. The eﬀ ort to bring out the true picture of Ngo Dinh Diem from the 
previously imposed clichés is commendable, sources are solid, and the logic of the 
author’s reasoning is, for most of the time, hard to challenge.
Jarema Słowiak
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